Firms Contracts And Financial Structure Pdf

firms contracts and financial structure pdf

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Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

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Miglo, Anton : Pecking order theory for government finance. In this article we argue that asymmetric information can explain why seignorage is an inferior choice to debt for governments. We also argue that the Ricardian equivalence for governments is very similar to what the Modigliani-Miller proposition is for corporations. Our model is based on Bolton and Huang in that money for governments is similar to what equity is for corporations. In contrast to their model, our model considers rational economic agents. Aisen, A.

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents. The first part of the book is concerned with the boundaries of the firm. The book describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control ma The book describes a theory—the incomplete contracting or property rights approach—based on the idea that power and control matter when contracts are incomplete.

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights ; the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares.

In economic theory, the field of contract theory can be subdivided in the theory of complete contracts and the theory of incomplete contracts. The incomplete contracting paradigm was pioneered by Sanford J. Grossman , Oliver D. Hart , and John H. In their seminal contributions, Grossman and Hart , Hart and Moore , and Hart argue that in practice, contracts cannot specify what is to be done in every possible contingency. Moreover, parties cannot commit themselves never to engage in mutually beneficial renegotiation later on in their relationship.

Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: Hart Published Economics. This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms.


Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure: Clarendon Lectures in Economics. By. Oliver Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pp. viii+ $ (cloth);.


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The paper examines the relationship betweenownership structure and value of the largestEuropean firms. If the largest owner is a family or a singleindividual, ownership concentration has noeffect on firm value, and the effect isnegative if the largest owner is a governmentorganisation. Firm value is found to have apositive feedback effect on ownershipconcentration except for governments, whichhold higher stakes in low-value firms.

Seems to have really blotted his copy book this time. Fancy a drink after work to celebrate. I have been posted to London to join the big boys with immediate effect so two things to celebrate.

Incomplete contracts

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Pecking order theory for government finance

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